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Introduction
Among the potential challenges that humans internally experience, some
individuals choose to face the existential quandary of trying to ‘know thyself’
(Foucault, 1984; 1988). Academic inquiry into the self has naturally been
associated with the idea of the individual’s perceived ‘search for self’ (Golomb,
1995; Wang, 1999), and has spawned separate discourses within leisure,
philosophy, and psychology literature, amongst others, that have drawn
upon different constructions. This paper aims to draw these separate
dialogues together in a holistic fashion so as to provide a clearer
understanding of the search for self on a broader level, as well as to elicit
a more nuanced understanding of the role that each of the following
constructions play in the search for self.
In philosophy and leisure, Aristotle’s “classical leisure ideal” has
purported that, by striving for self-growth through excellence in leisure
throughout life, individuals may follow the route to happiness (Barnes,
1984; de Grazia, 1962; Goodale and Godbey, 1988). Within psychology and
leisure literature, the path to self-realisation has been termed ‘self-
actualisation’ (Maslow, 1968; 1971); while according to Csikszentmihalyi
(1975; 1988; 1990; 1997) an activity that leads to a more complex self is
evidenced by ‘flow experience’. Lastly, matters concerning the experience
of the self have also recently been constructed as ‘existential authenticity’
(Steiner and Reisinger, 2005; Wang, 1999), as derived from a long history
of philosophical inquiry into human authenticity (Golomb, 1995).
Set across this range of disciplines, each of these concepts of self seem
to reflect an intrinsic state of being that may signify defining moments in
the perceived search for self, yet the constructions continue to be researched
independently, with minimal inter-disciplinary reference to each other. In
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this manner, knowledge of the self has not been built upon over time
employing a trans-disciplinary approach, but instead each construction
continues to be critiqued in its own right without consideration as to previous
cross-constructional dialectical advancements. In order to advance knowledge
of the self in a more effective manner, it is helpful to integrate these concepts
through comparing and contrasting their ascribed characteristics.
This chapter deconstructs four academic concepts that are implicitly
linked to understanding the self — the classical leisure ideal, self-actualisation,
flow experience, and existential authenticity — in order to build an integrated
understanding of the constructions and their role in the search for self.
Through the following discussion, a holistic approach to the search for self
is presented that is valuable in breaching the disciplinary boundaries that
have separated these concepts and thus more clearly elicits why individuals
may perceive meaning in specific life experiences. A conceptual model of
the search for self is offered that details the behavioural and mental processes
underpinning defining moments in attempts to know the self. As these types
of moments reportedly embody meaning for individuals (Golomb, 1995),
the model allows for a deeper understanding of how individuals construct
meaning from direct experience. It appears that within leisure studies, as
well as within philosophy and psychology, there is no existing research
that adopts an integrated approach to self of this nature.
Furthermore, the chapter questions recent conceptualisations of leisure
that adhere to a work/leisure divide, wherein leisure is the result of free
time from work or is based on activity type. Leisure is instead envisioned
as a state of mind (Pieper, 1952) or as an ideal way of living (Goodale and
Godbey, 1988). As such, understanding the search for self as presented
in this paper requires a return to classic leisure theory (de Grazia, 1962),
which has touted leisure as a vehicle for self-expression and fulfilment
(Stebbins, 1982), during which one may perceive the freedom to engage
in an action “because one wants to do it” (Neulinger, 1981: p. 15). With
the search for self bound to an internal state of leisure that is not necessarily
dictated by externalities, classic leisure theory can be applied to all facets
of life. This notion is particularly important for leisure studies as it not
only serves to account for individually derived meaning in the leisure
experience, but also helps to explain the behavioural choices of those who
are seeking the self within and beyond “leisure time”.
Framing the self
Working within concepts of ‘personhood’, previous studies have sometimes
utilised the terms ‘self’ and ‘identity’ interchangeably in building their papers
(Cone, 1995; Desforges, 2000; Elsrud, 2001; Galani-Moutafi, 2000; Noy,
2004). However, Desforges (2000) clarified that self and identity differ in
focus based on their respective scales of social interaction. While identity
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looks at the relationship between individuals and the collective social context,
self is more subjective and individualistic in nature. For example, in the
context of identity, an individual might be referred to as ‘middle class’ or
‘European’, while when referring to self one may be “qualified with adjectives
such as a moral person, an educated person or a fulfilled person” (Desforges,
2000: p. 930). While each of these adjectives certainly describe socially con-
structed identities, thereby demonstrating that self and identity cannot be
entirely separated, the difference in their scales of social interaction do show
that using the two terms interchangeably is erroneous. As this paper is
focused on the question of meaning in individualised experience, its scope
is strongly bound to the notion of self, rather than the wider power issues
that underpin ethnic, regional, national and class-based identity discourse.
From the perspective of psychology, Csikszentmihalyi (1990: p. 35)
has defined the self as “the dynamic mental representation we have of the
entire system of our goals”, or more simply — “the image each person develops
about who he or she is” (1997: p. 133). Knowing one’s goals and personal
image may appear to be straightforward, but if this were so, literary discourse
would not have grappled with the search for self for centuries (Golomb,
1995). Foucault (1984; 1988) has argued that the value in knowing one’s
self is largely a historical literary misinterpretation, wherein philosophical
literature originally intended to convey that it is important to ‘care for oneself’,
rather than to actually know the self. Consequently, knowing the self emerged
as a popular cultural narrative, and as such, many individuals perceive
the search for the self to be a valuable pursuit.
As the self is constructed through the externally provided possibilities
that society offers (Giddens, 1991), self-image is inherently derived through
a socially constructed lens. Thus, part of the challenge in knowing the self
is that the individual must negotiate the tension between individual agency
and societal structure. Nonetheless, it is mistaken to entirely deny agency
and place the locus of control in the search for self in the hands of society.
Nietzsche (1967) explained the importance of individual perceptions in assert-
ing that even though the individual must work within an inherited societal
formula, the individual still acts as a unique creative interpreter of this
formula and ultimately derives value from it in an original fashion. Maslow
(1971) maintained it would be impossible to achieve either society or the
individual without the other as it is clear that the two develop simultaneously
and in tandem.
Giddens (1991) has suggested that the search for self has become more
important in modern life as individuals are increasingly losing a secure
sense of self, or ontological security, as a result of the breakdown of the
social practices associated with traditional ways of life. Consequently, indivi-
duals have become less rooted and experience a less-fixed sense of identity
(Breathnach, 2006), resulting in an alienation that is driving the individual
search for the authentic (MacCannell, 1976). However, while this explanation
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may justify an increase in the number of individuals engaged in the search
for self, it is likely that the dynamic nature of the self (Csikszentmihalyi,
1990; Erickson, 1995) has made keeping a secure sense of self an elusive
goal that may even be an unattainable ideal. In support of the self as being
changing and inconsistent due to the constant shifting of one’s goals,
Pieper (1952: p. 103) argued “we are essentially on the way, beings who
are ‘not yet’”.
The concept of a dynamic self refutes the idea of an innate self that
is waiting to be realised and denies the notion of an Absolute or Universal
Self (Golomb, 1995). Naturally, rejecting the suggestion that all humans
are designed to move in the same metaphorical direction based on wider
society’s concept of what is ‘good’ or ‘right’ also implies that the self does
not follow a biological model set along evolutionary lines. Thus, the self
should not be said to ‘develop’ or ‘grow’, as this connotes a common human
direction and denies individual relativity. More accurately, the self can
be said to simply ‘change’. As an individual perceives self-change and
attempts to steer change based on goals, the perceived search for self
takes form. With the concept of a dynamic self that can change moment
to moment, the boundaries between constructions contending with
experiences of the self begin to dissolve, as can be first evidenced through
the classical leisure ideal.
Classical leisure ideal
Chronologically, Aristotle’s classical leisure ideal was developed before self-
actualisation, flow experience, and existential authenticity, and has provided
the original theoretical groundwork for leisure studies (Pieper, 1952). The
literature review undertaken for this research suggests that the classical
leisure ideal has heavily informed the later constructions of self-actualisation
and flow experience. The classical leisure ideal finds its roots 2,300 years
ago in Greek civilisation during which Aristotle philosophised that happiness,
defined by him as the ultimate goal in life, depends on leisure (Barnes,
1984), and that the capacity to use leisure well is the basis for a free man’s
whole life (de Grazia, 1962). The classical leisure ideal advocates leisure
as an ideal way of living over the course of one’s entire life, as opposed to
only during intermittent breaks from work and other occupations (Goodale
and Godbey, 1988).
Leisure, as a way of living, was characterised by a sense of freedom,
learning for its own sake and as being undertaken for self-development
(de Grazia, 1962). Thus, the classical leisure ideal is intimately concerned
with self and more specifically, the constructed idea of self-growth as a
mode of living. Aristotle purported that happiness can only appear in leisure,
and as such, the classical leisure ideal is also characterised by the notion
of intrinsic happiness (Barnes, 1984), signifying that an activity fitting
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appropriately within leisure is one that is perceived as performed for its
own sake and as its own end (de Grazia, 1962).
Although the classical leisure ideal was overwhelmed by the rise of
the Roman Empire and Calvin’s Protestant work ethic (Goodale and Godbey,
1988), what has carried on from ancient Greece into modern leisure discourse
is the idea of intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation assumes that an
activity may be performed for its own sake, independent of external influences
(Neulinger, 1981). However, intrinsic motivation has been a contested term
within leisure discourse as many maintain that it is not possible for an
individual to act independently of societal pressures (Godbey, 2003) and,
consequently, the idea of intrinsic motivation itself is argued to be socially
constructed.
Certainly, the border between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic moti-
vation is blurred, as Kelly (1996: p. 414) suggested: “leisure is not just
personal experience or social control or creative action or anything else.
It is not either/or: either individual or social, either free or controlled.” From
a social constructionist perspective, intrinsic motivation may well be an
unattainable ideal, well befitting as it was derived from the classical leisure
ideal. Nonetheless, subjectively, an individual perceives an activity as being
performed with a degree of choice (Neulinger, 1981), and as such, can perceive
an activity as being intrinsically motivated or not. Intrinsic motivation provides
the platform for the next two constructions of self to be discussed — Maslow’s
(1968) self-actualisation and Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) flow experience.
While the classical leisure ideal posits that each individual’s self has
the potential to grow towards a higher universal goal over the course of a
lifetime, a dynamic self concept refutes this upward motion and fundamentally
reduces the ideal to the notions of intrinsic motivation and self-change.
Hence, when stripped of the imperative to change in a certain manner over
time, the classical leisure ideal essentially espouses nourishing self-change
through regular engagement in intrinsically motivated activity.
Self-actualisation
From within psychology literature, and later utilised within leisure
research as well, Maslow’s (1968) conception of self-actualisation is also
centrally concerned with the development of the self to its highest potential.
Thus Maslow (1971: p. 175) positioned self-actualisation as the final goal
in the search for self:
[T]he goal, the goal of education — the human goal, the humanistic
goal, the goal so far as human beings are concerned — is ultimately
the ‘self-actualization’ of a person, the becoming fully human, the
development of the fullest height that the human species can stand
up to or that the particular individual can come to.
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Once again, as in the classical leisure ideal, it is clear that self-actualisation
is heavily concerned with the idea of growth or development based on what
society says is “right”. Interestingly, in a temporal context, Maslow stressed
that self-actualisation can be reduced to daily choices, wherein decisions
leading to growth are those characterised as “good” by society — such as
honesty and not stealing. In this light, self-actualisation is viewed as not
just a final outcome or goal, but also as a process where moment to moment
choices hold weight as any moment can potentially be a self-actualising
one. Maslow (1971: p. 47) further substantiated the notion of the self-
actualising moment, having argued that:
[S]elf-actualization means experiencing fully, vividly, selflessly, with
full concentration and total absorption. It means experiencing without
the self-consciousness of the adolescent. At this moment of experi-
encing, the person is wholly and fully human. This is a self-actualizing
moment. This is a moment when the self is actualizing itself. As
individuals we all experience such moments occasionally.
Transient moments of self-actualisation have been described by Maslow
(1971: p. 50) as “peak experiences”. As discussed in detail in the following
section, the idea of peak experience is strikingly similar to Csikszentmihalyi’s
(1975) flow experience as both describe a state in which the individual loses
self-consciousness and is entirely concentrated within the moment. Maslow
(1971) further depicted the self-actualising moment as being one’s own
person or actualising the “real self”, which strongly resembles the rhetoric
surrounding existential authenticity. Thus, it appears that the self-actualising
moment purports to potentially satisfy the search for self on a moment
to moment basis, whereas in contrast self-actualisation in its final sense
suggests a cessation to the search.
But a dynamic self debunks the idea of a final state of self-actualisation.
This is because an actualised self denotes a complete end to self-change,
which is theoretically unattainable (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Erickson, 1995;
Pieper, 1952). Furthermore, a dynamic self cannot be limited to the upward
path dictated by self-actualisation. However, as in the classical leisure ideal,
the dynamic self functions within the bounds of a non-directional self-
actualising moment, as self-change can be derived from transitory peak
experiences (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
Flow experience
Utilising groundwork in intrinsic motivation and peak experience,
Csikszentmihalyi (1975; 1988; 1990; 1997) termed the internal state of
being characterised by behaviour aimed at reaching neither genetic or cultural
goals, but purely of an intrinsic nature, as “flow experience”. While external
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goals such as satisfying thirst or becoming powerful can be categorised
as genetic and cultural goals respectively, Csikszentmihalyi (1990) argued
that to truly enjoy one’s self, or to experience flow, is to satisfy intrinsic
goals. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) chose the term ‘flow’ after many interviewees
used the word to describe how the internal state of being characterised
by flow experience feels.
Ranging from rock climbers and sculptors to dancers and surgeons,
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) interviewees reported that a common state of
mind develops when engaging in their activity, supporting the concept of
flow experience and leading to the conclusion that flow can occur in nearly
any activity that allows for increasing difficulty. Thus, the experience of
flow transcends notions of a work/leisure divide. This is based on flow experi-
ence’s most fundamental requirement, which is that the conditions required
for one to achieve a state of flow are continually evolving and become more
challenging as one’s level of expertise increases (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
If the activity is below one’s skill level, the person will become bored. Inversely,
if the activity is too difficult then the partaker will be anxious and stressed,
to also be followed potentially by boredom. Consequently, the conditions
of the activity must fall within a certain range of complexity in order for
the individual to be in the flow. Based on this, it is evident that while flow
may be found in any activity, the complexity of the activity that lends itself
to flow experience is entirely individualised (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
However, in order to result in flow experience, an activity must do more
than just provide appropriate challenges to the individual. An activity lending
itself to flow is also characterised by a number of essential elements that
describe the experience. In Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) study of flow activities,
he acknowledged seven characteristics that participants commonly described
when their activities were going particularly well: a challenging activity that
requires skills, the merging of action and awareness, clear goals and feedback,
concentration on the task at hand, the paradox of control, the loss of self-
consciousness, and the transformation of time. A “merging of action and
awareness” and a “loss of self-consciousness” is basically the same experience.
Thus, flow experience is essentially characterised by varying degrees of
challenge, loss of the perceived divide between subject and object, focused
concentration, clear trackable goals, perceived control, and time that tends
not to hold fast to the measurements of the conventional clock.
As it is often not easy to find the right balance between the elements
of flow experience, flow is not only variable, but also of a temporal nature
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). As such, finding this state of mind is often asso-
ciated only with intense individual moments occurring during involving
activities (Jones, Hollenhorst and Perna, 2003; Ryan, 2003). However, Mitchell
(1988: p. 59) explained “flow is not reserved for leisure in the limited sense
of sport or recreation, but is possible whenever commitment, energy, and
will find meaningful and effective application in the world of social experience.”
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This is clearly reminiscent of the Aristotelian conception of leisure centred
on intrinsic motivation and freedom. As a result of flow’s typical association
with temporary enjoyment and activity, leisure literature has adopted flow
experience as a tool to help explain leisure participation. For example, studies
have been undertaken to investigate flow in adventure recreation activities
such as white water canoeing (Priest and Bunting, 1993) and recreational
sports such as tennis and basketball (Stein et al., 1995). Leisure research
of this nature reinforces a socially constructed work/leisure divide that
attempts to limit leisure to certain areas of life.
Symptomatic of flow’s temporal interpretation is that the bulk of leisure
studies has tended to overlook Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) original depiction
of flow as a vehicle for self-growth. Often, flow has seemed to be only equated
with sensation seeking, as partly evidenced once again by its common
incorporation into adventure activity research (Hall, 1992; Hill, 1995; Jones,
Hollenhorst and Perna, 2003; Priest and Bunting, 1993; Ryan, 2003). In
contrast, akin to self-actualisation and also the classical leisure ideal, flow
experience is clearly characterised by movement that adds to the development
of the self (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Csikszentmihalyi (1990: p. 41) contended
that “following a flow experience, the organization of the self is more complex
than it had been before. It is by becoming increasingly complex that the
self might be said to grow”. Hence, the repetition of flow activity affords
the individual a heightened state of being and helps her/him to construct
an ever-changing but more complex self (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
Not only does flow share the idea of self-change with the other concept-
ualisations, but also three of its elements — the merger of action and
awareness, concentration on the task at hand, and the loss of self-con-
sciousness — are also descriptors shared with Maslow’s (1971) self-actualising
moment or peak experience, adding further credence to the notion that
self- actualisation and flow experience represent the same internal state
of being, effectively perceived intrinsic motivation, which also underpinned
the classical leisure ideal. As such, while the classical leisure ideal, self-
actualisation, and flow experience are typically discussed independently
within leisure discourse, they can be integrated under the single heading
of intrinsically motivated behaviour. Nonetheless, the clearly recognised
elements of flow experience are unique in offering a useful framework with
which to consider important moments in the search for self. They provide
an indicator so that an individual may recognise the internal state of being
during which flow has taken place, effectively opening the door to identifying
defining moments of self-change that are reflected in the experience.
The classical leisure ideal, self-actualisation, and flow experience can
each accommodate a dynamic self, within which changes may be driven
by intrinsic motivation, equating to the experience of an identifiable,
heightened state of being. However, as the direction in which the self changes
is not universally “upward”, but unique to each individual, the ability to
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steer one’s self towards one’s goals or self-image is subject to walking the
boundary between individual authenticity and societal control. Thus, the
discourse surrounding the concept of existential authenticity is also strongly
bound to the search for self.
Existential authenticity
Inquiry into the idea of an “authentic self” has a history that has sustained
rich philosophical debate for over two centuries (Golomb, 1995) and can
be traced back from the existentialists all the way back to Socrates (Dougherty,
2007). Ranging through famous existentialists such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Camus, and Sartre, each of these authors has been concerned
with the search for the authentic self (Golomb 1995). Termed ‘existential
authenticity’ in much modern discourse (Kelner, 2001; Kim and Jamal,
2007; Miars, 2002; Thompson, 2005), the concept has recently been an
area of intense debate as the utility of authenticity continues to be questioned
(Steiner and Reisinger, 2006; Wang, 1999; 2000), especially for it’s “lack
of clarity in its presentation” and its positioning as an unattainable ideal
(Dougherty, 2007: p. 97). Interestingly, the existential authenticity dialectic
seems to have largely escaped leisure research, despite existential
authenticity’s role as a construction of self.
Recent researchers (Berger, 1973; Wang, 1999) have argued that
existential authenticity can be defined as a state of being in which one
experiences her/his “true self”, a description which also characterised
Maslow’s (1971) self-actualising moment. However, the existentialists argued
that, in principle, any definition of authenticity would be self-nullifying
as it is an ideal with a different formula for each individual; what is authentic
for one person may not be authentic for another (Golomb, 1995). Nonetheless,
existential philosophers agreed that each individual is capable of judging
the relative authenticity of an act for one’s self. Unable to provide a universal
definition of authenticity, the existentialists mostly conceptualised the ideal
in reverse by describing what is inauthentic (Golomb, 1995). However, the
review of existential interpretations of authenticity undertaken for this
research do provide enough direct information to allow for a reasonable
grasp on the concept of seeking an authentic self.
In keeping with Pieper (1952) and Erickson (1995), who contested that
the self is changing and inconsistent, the existential movement did not
view the self as an innate fixed essence or static subject that is waiting
to be realised. Thus, the existentialists rejected the idea of a Universal Self
based on biological models, and having embraced the idea of a dynamic
self, suggested that authenticity “requires an incessant movement of
becoming, self-transcendence and self-creation” (Golomb, 1995: p. 9).
Kierkegaard contended that the self is not waiting to be realised, but is
something to be created and formed over life (Golomb, 1995).
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The idea that the dictates of society become secondary to the authentic
actions of the individual is a central tenet of authenticity (Golomb, 1995).
In this sense, authenticity relates to the ability of the individual to continually
steer the self toward one’s shifting goals while concurrently filtering through
societal influences. In contrast to self-change driven by intrinsically motivated
behaviour, which may be characterised by a loss of self-consciousness,
existential authenticity implies active self-steerage, in which the individual
perceives one’s self as an agent who may act authentically or not.
Heidegger (1962) argued that humans, rather than behaving according
to the authentic self, tend to behave inauthentically. While being human
entails having the freedom to choose from a range of possibilities, many
people tend to ignore their self and choose from common possibilities that
are shared with others (Steiner and Reisinger, 2006). Inauthentic behaviour
that is not based on free choice allows for escape from the anxiety and
responsibility of freedom (Golomb, 1995).
Contrary to inauthentic behaviour, authentic behaviour is such that
it is perceived as being true to the self, rather than to the dictates of society.
Nietzsche (1967) believed that if an individual is not able to express one’s
self within society then a deepening sense of alienation will occur, and that
this disintegration of social identity (Giddens, 1991) can intensify the process
of the search for the authentic (MacCannell, 1976). Appropriately, Nietzsche,
Kierkegaard, and Heidegger all agreed that by rejecting what one is not,
one becomes who one truly is (Golomb, 1995). This is in line with Galani-
Moutafi’s (2000: p. 205) claim that “one reaches a self-realization in view
of that from whom he/she differs.” Consequently, there is no theoretical
incompatibility between individual authenticity and societal roles. It is within
the social context that individuals must experiment in order to discern
their own authentic acts (Golomb, 1995).
Addressing the temporality of existential authenticity, Erickson (1995:
p. 124) stated that the individual determines moment by moment whether
to exist “wholly by the laws of their own being.” Steiner and Reisinger, (2006:
p. 303) elaborated on the importance of the moment in existential authenticity:
Because existential authenticity is experience-oriented, the existential self
is transient, not enduring, and not conforming to a type. It changes from
moment to moment. As a result, a person is not authentic or inauthentic
all the time. There is no authentic self. One can only momentarily be authentic
in different situations.
Miars (2002) also argued, from a counselling perspective, that being
entirely existentially authentic is a difficult task that no one will ever fully
complete. Thus, authenticity functions as an ideal to be striven towards
by seeking it constantly on a moment to moment basis. Golomb (1995:
p. 54) summarised this process-oriented conceptualisation of authenticity
through Kierkegaard’s position that existing is to be in the process of becoming
one’s self and that “becoming authentic requires perpetual movement without
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definite results.” Moreover, while admitting that we will mostly fail in being
authentic, Golomb (1995) pleaded that we should still try; in that trying
we are already succeeding.
An argument against the validity of authenticity, recognised by existential
philosophers themselves, is the difficulty of recognising instances of authen-
ticity. Criteria have not been given by the existentialists as to what is authentic
and what is not. Furthermore, any act may be authentic depending on
the individual — even acts that appear to be directly in line with societal
norms. This complexity is demonstrated in Erickson’s (1995) likening of
the self to a weaving that, when examined closely, is comprised of many
different threads whose colours appear to clash. However, once having stepped
back, the overall pattern becomes clear and cohesive and the importance
and role of each thread can be observed. Such is true of the aspects of
the self as a range of experiences may be authentic for the same individual.
Despite the inability of researchers to objectively recognise instances of
authenticity, the existentialists maintained that an individual may perceive
an experience as authentic or not, and as such, the individual can identify
experiences of perceived existential authenticity.
Erickson (1995) has suggested that individuals are not aware of their
authenticity on a moment to moment basis. Awareness depends on an occur-
rence that calls into question one’s self-conceptualisation. We are then made
aware of this aspect of our self and reflect as to whether we have been true
to our self or not (Erickson 1995). It is logical that an occurrence that brings
into question one’s self-conceptualisation is one that can drive self-change.
As the internal state of being described by flow experience and the self-
actualising moment is a vehicle by which self-change may take place, it
is proposed based on the existing literature that this state of being is a
reflection of engagement in an authentic act by an individual. Thus, it is
hypothesised that intrinsically motivated behaviour corresponds with
existential authenticity.
An integrated model of the search for self
In focusing on their roles in the individual’s perceived search for self, this
paper has examined the key tenets of the classical leisure ideal, self-
actualisation, flow experience, and existential authenticity. The analysis
is aimed towards individualised experiences of the dynamic self, as opposed
to the wider scales of social interaction and power relationships that concern
identity discourse. The review has identified similarities between the concepts
that provide a clearer picture of how the perceived search for self is
theoretically constructed. The relationships between the classical leisure
ideal, self-actualisation, flow experience, and existential authenticity in the
search for self are presented as a conceptual model in Figure 1. The model
is a first step in leisure research, as well as in the wider academic context,
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of both integrating the concepts in a trans-disciplinary manner, and
hypothesising that authentic behaviour can be identified as that which
is intrinsically motivated.
As the historical core of modern leisure, the classical leisure ideal called
for a way of living characterised by engagement in intrinsically motivated
activity. Also strongly linked to the idea of development of the individual
to the highest potential, self-actualisation is comprised of peak moments
in which the search for self may reportedly be satisfied. These self-actualising
moments are characterised by a loss of self-consciousness and complete
concentration on the activity; traits shared with a flow experience. As shown
in Figure 1, the classical leisure ideal provided the platform for the construc-
tion of self-actualisation. Next, with its grounding both in the classical leisure
ideal’s concept of intrinsic motivation and self-actualisation’s transitory
peak experiences, the flow experience dialectic provides a clear set of indicators
for identifying intrinsically motivated behaviour. While these three constructs
have largely fallen under separate discourses within leisure research, they
each fundamentally represent a heightened internal state of being
characterised by intrinsically motivated behaviour. Therefore, the classical
leisure ideal, self-actualisation, and flow experience are each categorised
under intrinsically motivated behaviour, as indicated in Figure 1.
Intrinsically motivated behaviour has been connected consistently in
the literature with notions of self-growth, or in the context of a dynamic
self, with self-change. By engaging in intrinsically motivated activity,
individuals may experience moments that drive self-change. Furthermore,
self-change as perceived by the individual must be directional as change
demands movement. Within directional changes of the self, it is logical that
an individual searching for self will steer towards a self perceived as being
truer to how one would like to be.
Intrinsically 
motivated 
behaviour
Existential 
authenticity 
(self-steerage)
Classical leisure ideal
       Self-actualisation
Flow experience
Figure 1 Conceptual model of the search for self
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It is theorised that the self-change derived from defining moments of
self experienced during intrinsically motivated behaviour allows the individual
to steer towards a more authentic sense of self that satisfies the search
for self on a momentary basis. It is hypothesised that these moments of
the authentic self, or existentially authentic moments, correspond with
individually perceived meaning in the leisure experience. As such, the search
for self is characterised by the correlation of intrinsically motivated behaviour
with existential authenticity.
While the experience of existential authenticity as the result of
intrinsically motivated behaviour allows the individual to perceive that an
active role may be taken in steering the self through the channels of society,
the relationship between intrinsically motivated behaviour and existential
authenticity is by no means unidirectional. As exhibited in Figure 1, the
pairing is bidirectional as one may also decide to steer towards intrinsically
motivated behaviour that is perceived will provide an authentic sense of
self.
Previously, researchers have been unable to identify instances of
existential authenticity, as what may be authentic for one person may not
be for another. The idea that intrinsically motivated moments equate with
authentic moments may provide a solution to this conundrum. The well-
established indicators of intrinsic behaviour — complete concentration on
the task at hand and the loss of self-consciousness during a challenging
experience — might be used to signpost moments of existential authenticity,
or defining moments in the perceived search for self. By providing a means
through which researchers can identify others’ experiences of existential
authenticity, valuable insight into the process of the search for self is gained.
Researchers can use the perceived experience of intrinsically motivated
behaviour as a pointer towards gaining a deeper understanding of the
meanings that underpin defining moments in the search for self.
Conclusion
While academics from different disciplines continue to investigate the
discourses surrounding the classical leisure ideal, self-actualisation, flow
experience, and existential authenticity separately, this paper has considered
the constructions in an integrated fashion, focusing on each construction’s
role in the search for self. Although none of the constructions can stand
alone to render a coherent framework for understanding the search for
self, when considered holistically, the concepts do illuminate critical cross-
constructional keys to a clearer understanding of the search for self in and
through leisure.
This integrated approach to the search for self theorises that intrinsically
motivated behaviour may be used to signpost moments of existential
authenticity. Regardless of whether intrinsically motivated experience is
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described under the rubric of the classical leisure ideal, self-actualisation,
or flow experience, its occurrence can signify defining moments in the search
for self and thus embody meaning for the individual. By using this holistic
approach to self, a clearer and deeper understanding of the perceived search
for self is achieved by locating the search within these critical, identifiable
moments of intrinsically motivated behaviour. Resultantly, defining moments
of self not only represent a temporary fulfilment of the search for self, but
also a fulcrum from which the individual search for an authentic self can
be steered.
In order to better understand human behaviour as embodied in the
leisure experience, it is essential to come to grips with the embedded mean-
ing(s) underpinning these internal experiences. An integrated approach
to the search for self provides leisure researchers with a more effective theo-
retical tool for teasing out the meaning individuals may attach to attempts
to know the self. Thus, the paper’s significance to leisure studies lies not
only in breaching the boundaries that have separated trans-disciplinary
constructions in the search for self, but also in more clearly eliciting
why leisure may play an important and meaningful role in some people’s
lives. Additionally, as defining moments in the search for self go beyond
a leisure domain defined by a work/leisure dichotomy, it is argued that
the need exists to transcend limited conceptualisations of leisure based
on time and activity and return to classic leisure theory based on leisure
as a state of self.
The above theoretical framework for understanding the roles that the
classical leisure ideal, self-actualisation, flow experience, and existential
authenticity play in the search for self provides the basis for future primary
research that engages directly with individuals and questions the meaning
they may derive from their experiences. Specifically, research should be
undertaken as to whether the indicators of intrinsically motivated behaviour
correspond in practice with individuals’ reported experiences of existential
authenticity. Through recognition that experiences that are perceived as
intrinsically motivated can momentarily satisfy the search for self, a clearer
picture of the overall search for self is revealed. Moments comprise lifetimes
and a lifetime spent with more engagement in intrinsically motivated
behaviour equates to a stronger sense of self, as an ongoing process of
becoming. After all, each of the constructions reviewed in this paper have
highlighted that it is the journey that is important, not the destination.
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